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In its counter-extremist strategy published at the beginning of October 2015, the government 
revealed that it would be undertaking a review of Shariah tribunals in Britain. The review was 
justified according to the government by evidence that the tribunals were acting in 
contravention of the law. The government went on to state emphatically that only one rule of 
law existed in the country, and that no informal religious system of law would be allowed to 
operate in competition with it. Not long after this publication, The Independent reported that 
a Jewish Beth Din tribunal in London was taking the unprecedented attempt of naming and 
shaming a Jewish man in a newspaper for refusing to give his wife a divorce. It is clear from 
these and other such incidents that legal pluralism and religious tribunals in Britain are 
currently a topical and pressing issue. Religion and Legal Pluralism is thus a timely and 
welcome academic contribution to the public debate. The book forms part of the series 
published by Ashgate on the current role and impact of religion in society. The series spans a 
wide variety of disciplines within the fields of humanities and social sciences. This particular 
book represents the first in the series that tackles the topic of religion and society from a legal 
perspective, with the issue of legal pluralism being chosen by Sandberg as the focus.  
As Sandberg notes in the preface, the focus of scholars specializing in religion and law before 
the Archbishop’s speech in 2008 was the legal manifestation of religious freedom.1 Little 
attention had been paid by scholars to the interaction between the state legal system and 
religious law, particularly the emergence of religious tribunals. The stormy debate which 
ensued after the Archbishop’s speech was the turning point after which legal pluralism and 
religious tribunals took center stage in the academic domain of religion and law. A key 
breakthrough in this regard came in the form of an empirical study conducted by Sandberg 
and his colleagues at Cardiff University, examining three religious tribunals already well-
established in Britain. The purpose of the study was to fill the vacuum of empirical data that 
existed in the literature on religious tribunals and legal pluralism in Britain, which it certainly 
accomplished. Religion and Legal Pluralism attempts to build on this project, by further 
enriching the literature with both theoretical and empirical studies.  
The book is made up of fourteen essays divided into three parts. Part i deals with the practical 
manifestation of legal pluralism, including the emergence of religious tribunals. Part ii looks 
at the way in which legal pluralism has been dealt with in the literature. Following this theme 
very closely, Part iii focuses on the theory of legal pluralism as an analytical framework. The 
list of contributors boasts a prominent array of both practitioners and academics working in 
the field of religion and law, resulting in a successful combination of theory and practice in 
the analysis presented. Sandberg begins the book with an introductory chapter that lays the 
foundation for the subsequent analyses. He criticizes the contradictory approach of the 
English courts toward religious belief, noting how they recognize the subjectivity of religious 
belief in principle, yet often refuse to accommodate subjective manifestations of belief in 
practice. A Christian girl must thus choose between her belief in purity rings or attendance at 
her school; she cannot choose both. Sandberg states that this binary approach must be 
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challenged if religious tribunals are to function at all. He endorses Shachar’s model of joint 
governance, noting that it recognizes and accommodates the multiplicity of identities that 
citizens adhere to in their daily lives, without compromising the civic rights bestowed upon 
them by the state legal system.
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 Sandberg ends by suggesting a new term that most 
appropriately captures the reality of religious tribunals and avoids the shortcomings of 
previous terms, namely Heterogeneous and Autonomous Legal Orders (halos). The term 
acknowledges the diverse nature of such legal orders and has the additional advantage of an 
acronym that expresses the relationship between such orders and their users. 
Mark Hill QC kick-starts Part i with a concise survey of the accommodation that the English 
legal system has afforded religious groups and their practices. After exploring the special 
legal status of the Church of England, he notes the numerous exemptions and 
accommodations that religious groups have received from the state to date. Smith follows up 
this general survey by honing in on Christian law and its established position in the English 
legal system. His particular focus is the Clergy Discipline Measure 2003, which marked 
significant reforms in the way the Church of England disciplines its clergy. This measure is a 
good choice for analysis, as it portrays with particular clarity the complex and complimentary 
relationship between secular and Christian law. Cranmer’s essay undertakes to show how 
Quakers actively lobbied for same-sex marriage, challenging the stereotype of religious 
groups as regressive organizations. The final three contributions in Part i are all based on 
empirical studies and contain the most valuable analysis in the section. Douglas, who took 
part in the Cardiff study on religious tribunals, provides an excellent socio-legal analysis of 
religious tribunals and their current role in the regulation of marriage and divorce. She 
strongly argues that religious tribunals should be permitted, like any other mediator or 
arbitrator, to assist parties in reaching a settlement if this is what suits them best. D’Auria 
draws on her empirical study of Catholic marriage tribunals to assess whether they uphold 
their own rules on the use of experts in nullity proceedings. Focusing on psychological 
incapacity cases, her research reveals that the tribunals are inconsistent in their use of experts, 
which she argues may be violating the right of the clients involved to due process. Bacquet 
finally draws on her empirical study of the significance of religious symbols to argue that 
states must take into account the important role of religious symbols in the lives of believers 
when contemplating how to accommodate their use in the public sphere. 
Part ii contains four essays loosely tied together by the topic of religion and legal pluralism 
yet differing greatly in their focus. Pocklington explores in detail the role of quasi-law in the 
English legal system. His analysis highlights the rise of English administrative law in the last 
century. This has resulted in the delegation of legal functions to private institutions, including 
most pertinently for the topic at hand, administrative tribunals. Hussain argues that accounts 
of legal pluralism have neglected the study of less prominent religious and cultural 
minorities. Such minorities should be included within studies of legal pluralism to enhance 
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the literature and ensure it provides a representative and accurate depiction of legal pluralism. 
Singler’s socio-legal analysis of new religious movements and their methods of dispute 
resolution on the Internet is thus an appropriate follow-up to Hussain’s article. Gozdecka 
ends Part ii with an in-depth survey of religious pluralism as a legal principle in European 
law, revealing how the principle has been rendered ineffective by consistent reliance on the 
margin of appreciation afforded to member states. 
In Part iii, Codling attempts to address the setbacks in the prominent theoretical expositions 
of legal pluralism that currently exist in the literature. She suggests that legal pluralism is best 
defined according to people’s own perceptions of law. A similar suggestion has already been 
made by the legal pluralist scholar, Brian Tamanaha, a fact that Codling neglected to 
mention.
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 Kenny reinforces Codling’s notion of subjective legal pluralism by showing how 
the practice of the veil is based on a diverse array of socio-religious factors that vary 
depending on the wearer. Kenny argues that focus should shift from the practice of wearing 
the veil to the actual individual who chooses to wear it, in order to appropriately asses how to 
respond to the practice. Davies next presents a secularist model of society that promotes 
pluralism yet ensures that the rights of individuals are not undermined as a result. Sandberg 
ends with a bold attempt to solve the problems inherent in legal pluralist theory by turning to 
Luhmann’s systems theory of law. He skilfully derives several benefits from Luhmann’s 
theory for the case of legal pluralism and fine-tunes his descriptive construction of socio-
legal orders. Nevertheless, when one evaluates the analysis as a whole, it must be submitted 
that Tamanaha’s view is once again vindicated. Law is a man-made construct, and thus no 
theory of law can ever successfully claim to have decisively discovered the reality of law. 
The book contains an interesting appendix in which Sandberg and Cranmer present a Draft 
Bill titled “Non-Statutory Courts and Tribunals (Consent to Jurisdiction) Bill” to illustrate 
how religious tribunals could be appropriately regulated. The bill seeks to address concerns 
about the genuineness of consent to the jurisdiction of religious tribunals as well as concerns 
that such tribunals illegally claim jurisdiction in criminal and family matters. In this regard, 
the bill creates statutory offences for exercising judicial jurisdiction without a person’s 
consent and for falsely claiming jurisdiction in matters of crime and in cases involving 
children. The bill addresses important matters and is a useful vehicle for discussion. Its 
underlying rationale is nevertheless questionable. Studies of religious tribunals have not 
pointed to consent as an issue that has been empirically proven. On the contrary, women were 
found to be empowered by the services provided by the religious tribunals.
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 One of the main 
issues that was empirically proven was the procedures of the councils, which were shown at 
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times to cause undue distress to clients. For this reason, discussions on how to reform such 
procedures would arguably be more pertinent and useful. Moreover, one of the main 
functions of Jewish and Islamic religious tribunals is to emancipate women who are 
purposefully chained in their marriage by oppressive husbands. In many cases, this 
necessarily involves the coercion of the husbands to cooperate in the proceedings. Such a bill 
may make tribunals reluctant to place pressure on their clients in these situations out of fear 
of prosecution. Disgruntled husbands could also use the bill (if hypothetically enacted) to 
ensure their wives do not obtain the religious divorce that they desperately need by claiming 
that they did not consent to the decision of the religious tribunal. As for the clauses of 
claiming false jurisdiction, it is questionable whether these are necessary, given the clear 
precedent that already exists in the law on the matter.
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 Indeed, Baroness Cox’s bill, which 
sought to limit the jurisdiction of religious tribunals, was rejected by the government 
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